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could bring action against them as private nuisances. Injunctions have been
granted on theories of mental depression resulting in physical impairment or
depreciation of property values in some cases,38 but the modern trend seems to
be to hold mental depression not enough, even though property values may also
be diminished.3 9 Although it could be argued that there is little justification for
a nudist camp, and that little economic loss would result to it by having to move,
they are generally placed far enough away from other habitations that the claim
of a property owner of being bothered by them seems rather frivolous.
Whether our society should accept the nudists and neither persecute nor prosecute
them, may be disputed. Generally, with the exception of a few states, existing
laws do not make nudism illegal. However, the diametrically opposed holdings
of the Ring and Burke cases serve as evidence that the differences in the statutes
are negligible compared to the differences in the views of the courts. These
differences in opinion, though, are not as to the intrinsic goodness of nudist camps,
but as to the propriety of construing a statute broadly or narrowly against them.
If a state is so inclined, a statute such as New York's adequately and unquestionably
prohibits nudism.
OWNERSHIP AS EVIDENCE OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR
PARKING VIOLATION
Kenneth Levin
Of the myriad traffic control problems created by the constantly increasing
number of automobiles, the enforcement of parking ordinances is one which has
given difficulty to some trial courts. In the typical situation, the policeman who
discovers and tickets an illegally parked automobile never sees its driver. If the
registered owner is later brought into court, he may contend that the state or city
can hold him responsible only by proving that he himself committed the offense.
Ordinarily the prosecution cannot make such proof by any direct evidence. But
the violation need not on that account go unpunished. The highest courts of a few
states have been willing to hold that the fact of ownership constitutes sufficient
circumstantial evidence against the owner to convict him of the violation. 1 More
commonly, however, there are statutes or ordinances which operate to make the
owner of an illegally parked automobile prima facie responsible in a criminal or civil
action. Appellate courts, practically without exception, have upheld this legis-
latively created presumption. 2
STAT. tit. 18, §4511 (1945); MASS. LAws c. 139, §20 (Supp. 1948); ILL. STAT. C. 1003/2,§1 (1935).
38. Gunderson v. Anderson, 190 Minn. 245, 251 N.W. 515 (1933) ; Sair v. Joy, 198 Mich.
295, 164 N.W. 507 (1917) ; Ware v. Wichatau, 113 Kan. 153, 214 Pac. 99 (1923).
39. PROSSER, TORTs §73 (1941) ; COOLEY, TORTS §439 (4th ed. 1932).
1. People v. Rubin, 284 N.Y. 392, 31 N.E. 2d 501 (1940) ; State v. Morgan, 72 R.I. 101, 48
A. 2d 248 (1946) (affirming conviction by an evenly divided court) ; see Commonwealth v.
Kroger, 276 Ky. 20, 25, 122 S.W. 2d 1006, 1009 (1938). But see People v. Bigman, 38 Cal.
App. 2d Supp. 773, 778, 100 P. 2d 370, 372-373 (1940).
2. Commonwealth v. Ober,'286 Mass. 25, 189 N.E. 601 (1934) (criminal action); City
of Chicago v. Crane, 319 Il. App. 623, 49 N.E. 2d 802 (1943) ("quasi criminal" action) ; City
of Buffalo v. Thorpe, 230 N.Y. Supp. 187, 132 Misc. 307 (Sup. Ct. 1928) (civil action).
Since most ordinances provide for criminal penalties, and since any defense which would
not avail the defendant in a criminal action would not do so in one called civil, it will be
convenient to speak of all the cases hereafter as though they were criminal cases.
Other courts have upheld ordinances which permit the police upon discovery of an
illegally parked automobile to remove it from the streets. The owner may regain possession
only by paying a service or pound charge, usually not more than five dollars. This charge
is not a fine because it represents actual cost of removal and storage of the automobile.
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The statutes and ordinances which make owners prima facie responsible for
parking violations fall into two general classes. First, there are those which provide
that the facts of violation and ownership together raise a prima facie presumption
that the owner committed the offense.3 This presumption is rebuttable. The second
type omits any reference to a prima facie presumption. It declares merely that
whenever an automoible is parked illegally the registered owner shall be subject
to the penalty for such violation. Or it may be couched in terms forbidding anyone
to permit a vehicle registered in his name to stand or park illegally. The courts
have usually interpreted these acts to mean that, when an automobile is found
illegally parked, that constitutes prima facie proof against the owner. 4 Thus, while
the bare words of this second type of statute would appear to render the owner
absolutely responsible whenever his automobile is illegally parked, the courts have
avoided the constitutional question inherent in such a provision,5 and have permitted
the owner to avoid conviction by showing that he did not in fact commit or
authorize the violation.
The defending automobile owner often attacks the constitutionality of the prima
facie presumption against him. He argues that he must be considered innocent
until proved guilty, that this presumption shifts the burden of proof to the defendant,
and that it forces him to testify. But such arguments have been uniformly rejected.
Our law, of course, requires that the defendant be presumed innocent until
proved guilty, and the burden of proving guilt rests on the prosecution. The courts
point out, however, that the legislature may provide what facts, if unrebutted, will
be sufficient to support a conviction. It is not always necessary to prove the guilt
of an offender by the direct testimony of an eyewitness. Reasonable inferences may be
drawn from facts. Given the facts of ownership and a violation, the legislature may
say that these are enough from which to infer that the owner committed the viola-
tion. Unless the defendant is able then to present further evidence showing that
the legislative presumption is not true in his case, the trier of fact will be justified
in giving conclusive effect to it. The prosecution will have carried its burden of
proof. Both the State and Federal Supreme Courts have often upheld this legisla-
tive rule of evidence.6
There is no need for a court proceeding unless the city wishes also to impose a fine.
Hughes v. City of Phoenix, 64- Ariz. 331, 170 P. 2d 297 (1946); Steiner v. City of New
Orleans, 173 La. 275, 136 So. 596 (1931) ; Jackson v. Copelan, 50 Ohio App. 414, 198 N.E.
596 (1935) ; accord, McLaurine v. City of Birmingham, 247 Ala. 414, 24 So. 2d 755 (1946).
3. City of St. Louis v. Cook, 221 S.W. 2d 468 (Mo. 1949); Commonwealth v. Kroger,
276 Ky. 20, 122 S.W. 2d 1006 (1938) ; People v. Kayne, 286 Mich. 571, 282 N.W. 248 (1938);
People v. Bigman, 38 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 773, 100 P. 2d 370 (1940).
4. City of Chicago v. Crane, 319 Ill. App. 623, 49 N.E. 2d 802 (1943) ; Commonwealth
v. Ober, 286 Mass. 25, 189 N.E. 601 (1934). Contra: People v. Forbath, 5 Cal. App. 2d
Supp. 767, 42 P. 2d 108 (1935). See text at note 14.
5. See note 11 infra.
6. In Mobile, J. & K. C. Ry. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35, 42 (1910), the Court said,
"Legislation providing that proof of one fact shall constitute prima facie evidence of the
main fact in issue is but to enact a rule of evidence, and quite within the general power
of government. Statutes, National and state, dealing with such methods of proof in both
civil and criminal cases abound, and the decisions upholding them are numerous." Again
in Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U.S. 178, 184-5 (1925), the Court said, "Every accused
person, of course, enters upon his trial clothed with the presumption of innocence. But that
presumption may be overcome, not only by direct proof, but, in many cases, when the facts
standing alone are not enough, by the additional weight of a countervailing legislative
presumption. If the effect of the legislative act is to give to the facts from which the
presumption is drawn an artificial value to some extent, it is no more than happens in
respect of a great variety of presumptions not resting upon statute." The cases cited in
note 1 supra are representative of those in which the presumption does not rest upon
statute, but upon judicial fiat.
For detailed discussion of presumptions and prima facie evidence see 9 WIGMORE, Evi-
[Vol. ,41
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The contention that the prima facie presumption forces a defendant to testify
is easily answered. He is not forced to take the witness stand; he is at liberty to
rebut the presumption by the testimony of witnesses other than himself. 7 Further-
more, no constitution guarantees that a defendant may not find himself in a position
where only his own testimony can save him; it merely prevents the prosecution
from calling him to testify.8
Two primary restrictions accompany the use of a rule of evidence like the one
under consideration. First, the presumption cannot be arbitrary or unreasonable.
The facts from which the inference is drawn must have a natural and rational
evidentiary relation to the fact inferred. 9 It is generally conceded that the owner
of a car usually controls it.3° Secondly, the inference of fact cannot be made
conclusive. The defendant must be permitted to rebut it if he can.'1
Evidence that the defendant did not commit or authorize the violation is usually
enough to rebut the presumption. Only one case appears to cast any doubt upon
the sufficiency of such evidence. 2 The ordinance there in question provided that
no person shall permit any vehicle registered in his name to stand or park illegally.
The court stated that this ordinance established prima facie proof of the owner's
guilt, but it did not go on to say what evidence would serve to rebut the presump-
tion. Moreover, the court used ambiguous language' 3 which another state court
subsequently interpreted to mean that even an owner whose car had been stolen and
parked illegally by the thief would be conclusively guilty. The latter court, faced
with an almost identical ordinance, was so disturbed by this possibility that it
refused to be influenced by the previous case. It would not even permit the raising
of a prima facie presumption against the owner under the ordinance, declaring
rather that the state would have to show by direct evidence that the defendant knew
of or acquiesced in the violation.' 4 Not until the legislature had specifically pro-
vided that evidence of ownership and a violation should constitute prima facie
DENCE §§2483-2498 (3d ed. 1940) and articles there cited in note 1, page 287. On the pre-
sumption of innocence see 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2511 (3d ed. 1940).
7. "If he was not in control he could easily have produced a witness or witnesses to
show it." People v. Rubin, 284 N.Y. 392, 397, 31 N.E. 2d 501, 503 (1940).
8. The Supreme Court put it succinctly in Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U.S. 178, 185
(1925): "If the accused happens to be the only repository of the facts necessary to negative
the presumption . . ., that is a misfortune which the statute under review does not create
but which is inherent in the case."
9. In Manley v. Georgia, the Supreme Court declared a Georgia statute to be unrea-
sonable, arbitrary, and violative of due process of law where "the connection between the
fact proved and that presumed [was] not sufficient." 279 U.S. 1, 7 (1929).
10. In People v. Kayne, 286 Mich. 571, 282 N.W. 248 (1938), testimony showed that
in Detroit on January 14 and 15, 1938, in cases where an automobile was parked in viola-
tion of an ordinance, the owner parked it in 87.6% of the cases, members of the owner's
immediate family in 8% of the cases, and some other person in 4.4% of the cases.
11. This is the reason courts have had to read the words "prima facie" into statutes
which on their face would appear to subject the owner to conclusive liability. To presume
conclusively that defendant committed or authorized the offense would violate the maxim
that a defendant is presumed innocent until proved guilty. "A statute creating a presump-
tion that is arbitrary or that operates to deny a fair opportunity to repel it violates the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Manley v. Georgia, 279 U.S. 1, 6 (1929).
12. Commonwealth v. Ober, 286 Mass. 25, 189 N.E. 601 (1934).
13. The Massachusetts court said, "In a word this is one of the unusual instances where
a person at his peril must see to it that the rules and regulations are not violated by his
act or by the act of another." Id. at 32, 189 N.E. at 604-.
14. People v. Forbath, 5 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 767, 42 P. 2d 108 (1935). The court used
broad language to the effect that "evidence of the mere fact that an automobile is regis-
tered in the name of a pe'son does not constitute prima facie proof, in a criminal case
arising out of the illegal operation of the car, that the registered owner was the operator
on such occasion, that he had knowledge of, aided or abetted in, or consented to, the same."
Id. at 773, 42 P. 2d at 110.
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